The usual conclusion in the literature is that sunspots reduce welfare because of the agents' risk aversion. However, if sunspots can lead to escape from an inferior steady state (poverty trap), this conclusion does not necessarily hold. Escaping trajectories can have much higher welfare than those remaining in the poverty trap. The ex-post welfare effect can be positive for initial conditions such that the probability of escape is sufficiently close to one. Numerical simulations of the model support this conjecture.
1 Introduction "Sunspot equilibria" are "rational expectations equilibria in which purely extrinsic uncertainty affects equilibrium prices and allocations", see Woodford (1990) .
"Purely extrinsic uncertainty" denotes some random variable which has no effect on preferences, endowments, or technology. If this random variable and the resulting allocations and prices are stationary, one speaks about stationary sunspot equilibria, or SSE. In discrete time, one of the ways in which SSE are constructed is by randomization among different non-sunspot equilibria or deterministic trajectories converging to a steady state. This procedure can be performed when a non-sunspot steady state is locally indeterminate. Indeed, in a simple OLG economy with a constant supply of money, as in Azariadis (1981) , a necessary condition for the existence of a particular kind of SSE is exactly the condition for the local indeterminacy of the non-sunspot rational expectations equilibrium (REE), see Woodford (1990) . This connection between indeterminacy of a REE and the existence of some SSE (known as "Woodford's Conjecture") was established for a broad class of discrete time models, for example in Woodford (1986) ; Grandmont (1986); and Spear, Srivastava, and Woodford (1990) .
The usual conclusion in the sunspot literature is that sunspots reduce welfare because of the agents' risk aversion. Following the sunspot variable results in a less smooth consumption path. On average, one should see a lower intertemporal welfare. However, if sunspots can lead to escape from an inferior steady state (poverty trap) as is posited in Slobodyan (2001) , this conclusion does not necessarily hold. Escaping trajectories can have much higher welfare than those remaining in the poverty trap, especially if the escape happened early, thus increasing ex-post expected intertemporal welfare in the presence of sunspots. The model described in Slobodyan (2001) included two competing inßuences on the expected intertemporal welfare functional. One could expect a positive inßuence to prevail for the initial conditions, guaranteeing high escape probability. Conversely, a low escape probability might mean a negative ex-post contribution from self-fulÞlling beliefs to the intertemporal welfare.
Two factors play a major role in determining the net result of the two effects. First is the difference between welfare accumulated along trajectories originating "just inside" of the trap and "just outside" of it. For example, if convergence to the steady state is fast and contemporary utility is signiÞcantly different in the steady states, then one would expect a rather large step between "just inside" and "just outside" trajectories. The other major factor is escape probability. When the initial point implies a high escape probability, the expected intertemporal welfare should be higher, all other parameters being equal.
The Þrst major factor, the "step" in intertemporal welfare, is not large in the Slobodyan (2001) model for the simple reason that for realistic values of the increasing returns to scale, two eigenvalues with negative real parts are complex.
The trajectory converging to the positive steady state does so in an oscillatory fashion. In particular, the trajectories that start just above the poverty trap boundary spend a long time eating up capital stock, behaving exactly like the trajectories in the trap. Accumulation of the capital which eventually leads to higher contemporary utility starts relatively late, when the discount factor e −ρt is already signiÞcantly lower than one. BeneÞts of being out of the trap are diminished as a result.
The second major factor, probability of escape, was extensively studied in Slobodyan (2001) . There exists a band of initial conditions below the trap boundary, such that trajectories initiated in this band have a non-negligible probability of escape. This probability increases as the initial condition approaches the boundary. Therefore, only for initial conditions very close to the boundary is the effect of sunspot ßuctuations expected to be positive on average.
For the rest the result will be zero or negative.
The degree of risk aversion also contributes to the expected sign and magnitude of the sunspot's inßuence on welfare. A high degree of risk aversion might mean that the negative impact prevails even in the region where the probability of escape is reasonably high.
To obtain some insights into the relative strength of those competing inßu-ences as a function of model parameters, I performed numerical simulations of the SDE derived in Slobodyan (2001) , and calculated the welfare along different stochastic trajectories. The main result is relatively pessimistic. Even though a non-negligible probability of escape exists for initial consumption levels 10 to 20 percent lower than the boundary value, ex-post expected welfare in this region is essentially the same as in the deterministic case. The negative effect of the sunspot ßuctuations is close to zero. For initial conditions (capital and initial consumption) very close to the boundary, expected welfare in the sunspot case starts to dominate the deterministic one. It is impossible to quantify to what degree risk aversion inßuences welfare, because the expected welfare gain depends on it in a very complicated way.
Results of the current paper and of Slobodyan (2001) suggest that the distance from the poverty trap boundary to the initial condition point is of critical importance where the escape is concerned. I consider a model in which government has an inßuence on the exact location of the boundary. Implementing policy that moves the boundary to the initial point greatly increases both probability of escape and the expected welfare gain.
Section 2 of this paper gives numerical results for the effect of sunspot shocks on the ex-post expected intertemporal welfare in the model studied in Slobodyan (2001) . Section 3 uses analytical results on escape probability to estimate expected welfare gains or losses. Section 4 slightly modiÞes a model in which the government can change the parameters of the tax regime. I consider whether government actions could change the location of the poverty trap boundary so that the economy becomes closer to the boundary. If this is possible, then the government could conduct a policy aimed at increasing the probability of escape under the inßuence of sunspot ßuctuations. This opens up a channel of inßuence for the government, which is otherwise non-credible and unable to coordinate agents' beliefs on the trajectory converging to the welfare maximizing steady state.
Inßuence of Sunspots on Welfare -Numerical Results
The model studied in this paper is the same as that used in Slobodyan (2001) , and represents a version of the Benhabib and Farmer (1994) Slobodyan (2001) .
The economy consists of a large number of identical consumers seeking to
where C is consumption, K capital, N work effort, r interest rate, and w the wage rate. There are a large number of identical Þrms with the production
where a + b = 1, α > a, β > b, and K and N are economy-wide averages of K and N per Þrm, which are taken as given by every individual Þrm. The solution to the problem in log variables is given by the following system of equations, nearly equivalent to the one derived in the original Benhabib and Farmer (1994) model:
where w, v, and u are given by
After the changes of variables given below,
the system transforms into
The steady states of (5) are
If the following conditions hold, (2001)).
1 Steady states B and C both represent trajectories with different asymptotic behavior that diverge to (−∞, −∞) in the (c,k ) space. The change of variables collapses inÞnity points from the lower half of the (c,k ) space onto the vertical half-axis in the (x,y ) space. Trajectories with different asymptotic behavior at minus inÞnity are mapped onto different points at the axis.
2 There were previous attempts to obtain the region of stability of the positive steady state in this model; see, for example, Russell and Zecevic (1998) for the Lyapunov function approach. The approach used here is much broader, as it enables me to study the global dynamics of the model instead of the compact neighborhood of the steady state, as in the reference. Writing the value of intertemporal welfare as a differential equation with initial value 0, I arrive at the following:
The system is three-dimensional, and there is an explicit dependence on time in To decrease the time needed to run simulations I increased the discount rate for all models from 0.02 to 0.06. Numerical simulations were run up to t = 100.
Time step ∆ = 0.1 was used for all simulations. It was assumed that sunspot noise stops after the sample path consumption exceeds the boundary value by 0.01, therefore reducing escape probabilities. As explained above, the welfare accumulated along the trajectory that starts "just in" the trap is not very dif- lower than the boundary value) where the probability of escape is about 0.5%, the welfare is essentially the same. The welfare cost of sunspot ßuctuations far from the boundary is essentially zero. Yet when d reduces to 0.10 or less, there is a noticeable increase in the average welfare gain. Translating this gain into initial consumption, which under deterministic conditions yields the same welfare, gives a 2.8% positive difference at peak value. increase in the initial consumption. On the other hand, a trajectory that starts essentially at the boundary with probability of escape close to 1 cannot have the welfare gain more than ∆, meaning that at most a 1% increase in the certainty equivalent consumption will be achieved. the log consumption equal to 14% for ßuctuations outside of the trap. This magnitude depends on the strength with which the drift term in equation (7) pushes consumption back to its steady state value, and is probably a complicated function of the model parameters 3 .
Certainty equivalent consumption gains for Models 3 through 6 are presented in welfare in the region where escape probability is negligible, I plot the calculated average welfare gain together with 95% conÞdence bands. The plot is presented in Figure 13 . Even for batches of 1500, conÞdence band for the welfare gain includes zero in the region where probability of escape is very low 5 .
Finally, I would like to compare the welfare gain from sunspot ßuctuations with some estimates of the welfare cost of business cycles. In Lucas (1987) 5 For this particular model, less than 0.5% of trajectories escape if d > 0.10. Further assume that the trajectory which escapes the trap accumulates welfare
This is a very crude approximation, because in general the welfare depends on the time of escape, T d . Using the two 
Notice that I use T d+² instead of T d , because the trajectory escapes (the sunspot variable stops) only after reaching (c−k) g +² in numerical simulations. Figure 10 demonstrates that V (k 0 , c 0 ) is a linear function of the distance to the boundary,
Probability of escape, P (T d+² < ∞), was calculated in Slobodyan (2001) and is given in Eq. (21) in that paper,
Substitute P (T d+² < ∞) into (8) and subtract the value of the welfare without sunspots, V (k 0 , c 0 ) = V g − λd, to obtain an estimate of the expected welfare gain,
Note that the expected gain is proportional to the probability of escape and is increasing in a nearly linearly fashion in ∆ 7 . One should expect, then, that the logarithm of the average welfare gain is approximately inversely proportional to the square distance to the boundary, because
A plot of the log expected gain versus (d + ε)(1 − e −(d+ε) ) is presented in Figure 14 . Only those data points where the average welfare gain is signiÞcantly different from zero are plotted on the graph. The dependence is close to linear as implied by the formula above. As it is impossible to derive analytically the dependence of ∆ -welfare gain from escaping-on σ, I cannot say anything about the functional form of the dependence of the expected welfare gain on σ.
Increasing the Probability of Escape
It was demonstrated in the previous sections that if the economy is trapped and follows a sunspot random variable, getting the initial conditions as close to the trap boundary as possible is clearly beneÞcial. This increases the expected welfare gain from following the sunspot variable and the probability of escape from the trap. In the original Benhabib and Farmer (1994) paper the mechanism that could be used to adjust any of the model parameters is absent. The economy coordinates on some trajectory inside the trap and learns to believe In this Þnal section I want to explore a model, based on Benhabib and Farmer (1994) , which includes a government that can tax economic agents.
My goal here is to look at different policy interventions, like a decrease in the total level of taxes collected, or changed progressiveness of the tax system. The situation will be very clear if some intervention achieves two objectives at the same time: decreasing the ordinate of the steady state C in Figure 1 and decrease the slope of the stable manifold at C. If some simple intervention can achieve both objectives, then for any initial condition in the development trap the intervention lowers the distance between initial condition and the trap 8 .
To predict the results of such an intervention it is necessary to assume that agents in the economy maintain the same level of consumption, thus leaving y = C/K unchanged. The level of the work effort supplied by the agents jumps to the new level deÞned by the Þrst order conditions. It is unclear what other assumptions could be maintained. For example, I could consider coordinated changes of consumption and labor effort that leave the instantaneous utility unchanged. However, the policy intervention will most likely change the level of the intertemporal utility that could be achieved by the economy in the steady state. It is unclear then on what grounds one could consider iso-utility changes.
The model used in this Section is a variant of Guo (1999) . There is a continuum of identical households maximizing the utility
where C and N are household consumption and working hours. Households own capital that is rented to Þrms, and the budget constraint is given by
with r being the interest rate, w the wage rate, and K the household's capital stock. Tax rates are given by the following expressions:
where y n = wN and y k = (r − δ)K are the household's taxable labor and interest income. Tax code includes depreciation allowance. Parameters φ i and η i , i = k, n determine the slope and the level of taxes. φ not equal to 0 means "progressive" tax, because in this case the marginal tax rate is higher than the average. In a departure from Guo (1999) where y k and y n were the steady state values of the of the taxable interest and wage income, in this paper they will represent economywide averages of respective incomes. The difference means that in a symmetric equilibrium where every household has the same amount of capital and supplies the same number of hours, tax rates will not depend on the current output. In the original paper, the symmetric equilibrium average tax rates were decreasing in the average level of output, thus generating countercyclical government spending. In the variant used here the average tax rate in the symmetric equilibrium does not depend on the business cycle stage, which more closely resembles the reality.
There is also a continuum of identical Þrms with the production function
where a + b = 1, α > a, β > b, and K and N are economywide averages of K and N per Þrm, which are taken as given by every individual Þrm. From the proÞt maximization, the interest rate and the wage rate are given by
The government balances its budget at every point in time. Therefore, there is no government debt in the model.
In a symmetric perfect foresight equilibrium every household has the same amount of capital, supplies the same number of hours, and every Þrm employs the same quantity of capital and labor. Using capital letters to denote aggregate values, I write the following current value Hamiltonian as
Taking corresponding derivatives, one gets the necessary conditions:
together with the capital accumulation equation
Substituting (19) into (20) and (21), recalling that by deÞnition in the sym- and substituting in (16) and (17), one obtains the following set of equations:
Switching to logs, c = log(C), k = log(K), y = log(Y ), and using (24) and (27) to obtain y as a function of c and k, I arrive at the following 2-dimensional system of differential equations
where
Finally, changing the coordinates to
I get the system of equations presented below,
By construction, x and y are nonnegative, therefore only the Þrst quadrant of the (x, y) space should be considered.
It is possible to carry on the same procedure as with the model used in accompanying paper and show that the current model's phase portrait is essentially the one presented in Figure 1 . If u > v then Jacobian at the positive steady state has positive determinant and indeterminacy is possible. To get a stable origin I need ρ > δη k φ k . The latter condition also guarantees that the steady state C=(0, ρ−δη k φ k ) is located on the vertical half of the y axis and that C is a saddle. The area beneath the stable manifold of C is the development trap exactly as in the previous model.
As mentioned previously I should consider two possible inßuences of any policy intervention. One is the change in the "height" of the steady state C, and another is the change in the initial slope of the stable manifold of C. In order to make the calculations simpler assume that there is no difference between labor and capital in the tax code, i.e. η k = η n = η and φ k = φ n = φ. The two variables of interest are given by
As mentioned previously, for realistic values of the capital (say, less than e
times the value at the positive steady state) the value of consumption that puts the economy into the trap implies very low x 9 . In the Þrst approximation one can disregard the effect of the policy intervention on y 1 and concentrate on y 0
instead.
If η = 1, φ = 0 then there are no taxes in this economy. The policy intervention that lowers the stable manifold of C is a shift to progressive taxation, φ > 0. In this case there still are no taxes in the symmetric equilibrium and the change is revenue neutral. On the other hand, if the economy initially had a ßat tax code, η < 1, φ = 0, then two interventions achieve the same goalincreasing the progressiveness of the tax code and reducing the level of taxes by increasing η. Those two interventions work for any tax code such that it is not absolutely progressive (φ < 1) and taxes in the symmetric equilibrium exist
If ρ < δ then a very dramatic intervention becomes possible. When y 0 = ρ − δηφ = 0, the steady state C merges with the origin and moves to the lower half of the vertical axis if one further increases η or φ. The origin in this case loses stability and becomes a saddle. Figure 1 shows that in this case the development trap disappears and every trajectory converges to the positive steady state A.
However, for ρ > δ this is impossible.
Using the same approximation to the stochastic process solving (34) and calculating the probability of escape as in the previous paper, one gets
It is easy to see that any policy that reduces d and y 0 increases the probability of escape from the trap.
Summary of the effects of policy interventions is given in the following claim.
Claim 1
Assume that the level of consumption does not discontinuously change through the policy intervention. Then the following policies lower the development trap boundary and increase the probability of escape:
i) increasing progressiveness of the tax code (increasing φ);
ii) reducing the symmetric equilibrium tax rate (increasing η);
iii) combining i) and ii).
Moreover, if ρ < δ then moving to a very low tax rate (η ≈ 1) and very progressive tax code (φ ≈ 1) eliminates the development trap altogether.
For completeness I will study the effect of changes in η or φ on y 1 . Taking the derivative of y 1 with respect to η and simplifying, I get the following expression
Therefore, the intervention that decreases y 0 also increases y 1 . For large x the effect of the policy intervention thus becomes ambiguous -it can increase or decrease the distance to the trap boundary.
The effect of changing φ on y 1 is ambiguous. The derivative is given by
It is impossible to sign the derivative in the general case. Some limit cases can be studied, however.
Assume that y 0 = ρ − δηφ = 0. In this case
At the point where the steady state C merges with the origin ∂y1 dφ is negative.
By continuity ∂y 1 dφ is negative also in some neighborhood of the point (η * , φ * )
where ρ − δη * φ * = 0. In this neighborhood a policy that increases the tax code progressiveness (raising φ) decreases both the intercept and the slope of the stable manifold.
Consider now ∂y1 dφ | φ=0 . This derivative is proportional to
This is a quadratic equation in ρ δη . For ρ δη = 0, (38) is negative and therefore is negative in some neighborhood of this point.
ρ δη is small when η is large (low tax rate) and ρ is low relative to δ. However for ρ ≈ δ, which is a usual assumption in the literature, (38) is likely to be positive.
The above analysis demonstrates that second order effect of the policy directed to increased escape probability is likely to be negative. The only case where it is likely to be positive is when y 0 = ρ − δηφ is very low and the development trap is small. As observed previously, for realistic values of the initial capital second order changes will be negligible because x is very small.
Conclusion
In this paper I used numerical simulations of stochastic differential equations to study the inßuence of self-fulÞlling beliefs driven ßuctuations on the expected intertemporal welfare of a representative agent. I expected to see 2 major inßuences -a negative effect because of convexity of the utility function, and a positive one related to the signiÞcantly higher welfare achievable along the trajectories that escape from the poverty trap. I demonstrated that for the sunspot speciÞcation used both here and in the accompanying paper, Slobodyan (2001) , there is no discernible negative effect on the average welfare if the ßuctuations do not lead to escape from the poverty trap. The positive effect related to the positive contribution from escaped trajectories can be rather large. If I want to Þnd a deterministic trajectory producing the same welfare as the average quantity generated by a batch of sunspot-driven paths starting from the same initial conditions, then I need to start the deterministic trajectory with consumption level up to 7% higher. For the model used here sunspot ßuctuations are unambiguously positive. They either leave the welfare unchanged on average, or increase it rather signiÞcantly if there is signiÞcant probability of escape from the poverty trap because of sunspots. The effect depends on the initial difference between consumption and its boundary value.
As mentioned above, sunspots are not very beneÞcial in the current model. For example, in Gali (1995) it is possible to have 3 steady states, with "low"
and "high" ones being saddles, and the "middle" one a sink 11 . The region of stability of the "middle" steady state is the development trap in this model. The region is bordered by two stable manifolds, one of them converging to the "low" steady state, and another to the "high" one. If the escape from the trap occurs when the sunspot-driven trajectory hits a stable manifold, then the trajectory making escape towards the "high" steady state immediately starts accumulating extra capital and welfare.
Finally, I looked into the possible role of a government in the model allowing indeterminate poverty trap. Both current and the accompanying papers clearly demonstrated how important the distance between the initial condition and the boundary of the poverty trap is. If the initial condition is relatively hard to move (it might be determined by habit formation or cultural norms), then moving the poverty trap boundary instead can help the economy. In a version of the model studied here that allows taxation of the income, reducing the tax rate or increasing progressiveness of the tax code lowers the trap boundary for realistic initial conditions, thus increasing the probability of belief driven escape and expected welfare gain from sunspot ßuctuations.
